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We investigate the macroeconomic implications of a ¯nancial distortion that arises when
the burden of some pre-existing debt|the debt overhang|weighs on a ¯rm's investment
decision. When the ¯rm is so leveraged that it risks defaulting on its debt obligation,
it anticipates that the marginal bene¯t of any new investment will be reaped by its
creditors in the event of default. Hence, the higher the probability of default, the lower
the marginal return that the ¯rm expects to receive from its investment, the smaller its
incentive to invest. The probability of default acts like a tax that discourages the ¯rm's
investment creating a wedge between the socially optimal level of investment and the
¯rm's privately optimal one. The sub-optimality of the investment choice stems from the
fact that the ¯rm does not internalize the positive e®ect of its investment choice on its
creditors' payo® in the event of default.1
The impact of debt overhang is not limited to investment decisions in physical capital.
It also discourages other choices such as the e®ort exerted by managers and executives,
hiring decisions, and expenditures incurred in order to maintain and improve production
and sales.2 In particular, when a ¯rm decides whether to hire, it weighs the current
search, recruiting, and training costs against the future bene¯ts o®ered by the additional
productive worker. Just as debt overhang leads ¯rms to under-invest in physical capital,
it constrains its investment in labor.
We show that the debt overhang distortion arises naturally in environments where the
investment in capital and labor of a limited liability ¯rm is non-contractible, i.e., the debt
contract cannot specify or depend on the ¯rm's future investment and hiring decisions.
This friction creates a moral hazard setting: The non-contractible investment choice
of the ¯rm (the agent's hidden action) a®ects the payo® of the lender (the principal).
Following Innes (1990), we show that the constrained-optimal contract is risky debt, and
that the debt overhang leads to under-investment.
We incorporate the debt overhang distortion in a business cycle model and we ¯nd
that it can dramatically amplify and propagate the e®ects of productivity, government
spending, volatility and funding cost shocks. There are two positive feedback loop mecha-
nisms at work, both acting through the probability of default. First, shocks that increase
the probability of default, exacerbate the debt overhang distortion, and decrease invest-
ment; in turn, a lower level of investment further increases the probability of default, in
a static feedback ampli¯cation mechanism. Also, shocks that increase the probability of
default and decrease investment, have a persistent negative e®ect on the ¯rm's capital,
thereby increasing the probability of default persistently over time, in a dynamic feedback
1Myers (1977) is the seminal article describing how existing corporate debt leads to sub-optimal invest-
ment decisions. The following paragraph by Stein (2003, page 118) best summarizes the debt overhang
distortion: \[A] large debt burden on a ¯rm's balance sheet discourages further new investment ...This
is because if the existing debt is trading at less than face value, it acts as a tax on the proceeds of the
new investment: part of any increase in value generated by the new investment goes to make the existing
lenders whole, and is therefore unavailable to repay those claimants who put up the new money."
2Myers (1977) emphasizes the wide range of discretionary decisions distorted by debt overhang: \The
discretionary investment may be maintenance of plant and equipment. It may be advertising or other
marketing expenses, or expenditures on raw materials, labor, research and development, etc. All variable
costs are discretionary investments ...This is not simply a matter of maintaining plant and equipment.
There is continual e®ort devoted to advertising, sales, improving e±ciency, incorporating new technology,
and recruiting and training employees. All of these activities require discretionary outlays. They are
options the ¯rm may or may not exercise; and the decision to exercise or not depends on the size of
payments that have been promised to the ¯rms creditors."
1propagation mechanism.
Through these mechanisms, productivity and government spending shocks have am-
pler and more persistent e®ects than in a standard model without debt overhang. In
addition, shocks that increase the volatility of productivity and funding cost shocks,
which do not have any e®ect in the standard model, increase the probability of default,
exacerbate the debt overhang distortion, and have ample and persistent negative e®ects
on investment.
Recent empirical work in corporate ¯nance has stressed the quantitative importance of
the overhang e®ect of corporate debt. Hennessy (2004) shows that debt overhang distorts
both the level and composition of investment, with under-investment being more severe
for long-lived assets. He ¯nds a statistically signi¯cant debt overhang e®ect regardless
of ¯rms' ability to issue additional secured debt. Using ¯rm level data and studying a
large variety of credit frictions, Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2007) document that the
magnitude of the debt overhang drag on investment is substantial, especially for distressed
(high probability of default) ¯rms. They ¯nd that debt overhang decreases the level of
investment by approximately 1 to 2 percent for each percent increase in the leverage ratio
of long-term debt to assets. Finally, Moyen (2007) measures a large overhang cost both
with long-term debt and with short-term debt.
While the corporate ¯nance and international ¯nance literature have long acknowl-
edged the debt overhang e®ect,3 our article is the ¯rst to introduce debt overhang in an
otherwise standard business cycle framework, and to evaluate quantitatively the resulting
ampli¯cation and propagation mechanisms of shocks.4 Whereas we study how debt over-
hang reduces the ¯rms' bene¯t of investing, the recent literature has focused on ¯nancial
frictions that raise the ¯rms' cost of investing, or directly constrain the level of investment.
On one hand, a strand of the ¯nancial frictions literature, following the contribution of
Kiyotaky and Moore (1997), assumes that there is no enforceability for unsecured lending,
and studies equilibria where loans are fully collateralized and no default occurs. Since
collateral values are pro-cyclical, the credit constraint binds less during expansions, which
induces credit cycles. However, a common criticism of credit constraint models is that
they cannot generate large ampli¯cation for plausible parameter values.5 On the other
hand, most of the ¯nancial frictions literature has focused on how agency costs associated
with the asymmetric information between the lender and the ¯rm a®ect the cost of credit
and thus the level of investment. In the works of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), monitoring resources are
used whenever defaults occur. Ex-ante, this generates an external ¯nance premium that
contributes to amplify business cycle °uctuations. Section 3.4 compares this framework
with our debt overhang model. We ¯nd that, although the qualitative predictions of the
3Because foreign debt e®ectively generates a tax on domestic investment, debt overhang e®ects have
also been studied in the international ¯nance literature. Examples are Krugman (1988) and Bulow and
Rogo® (1991). See Obstfeld and Rogo® (1996, Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4) for a review.
4Lamont (1995) studies how debt overhang can create multiple equilibria in which expectations de-
termine economic activity. Philippon (2009) studies how the interaction of debt overhang in multiple
markets can amplify shocks and even lead to multiple equilibria, and how governments can improve
e±ciency through bailouts and other policies during the renegotiation of the debt contract. Although
these two papers substantially di®er from ours as to motivation, focus, approach, model, and results,
their conclusions complement and reinforce our ¯ndings.
5See Kocherlakota (2000) and C¶ ordoba and Ripoll (2004). For an alternative result, see Cooley,
Marimon and Quadrini (2004) who show that limited contract enforceability ampli¯es the impact of
technology shocks.
2two frameworks are close, the ampli¯cation mechanism generated by the debt overhang
distortion is quantitatively more important.6
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the economy, with a focus on
the ¯nancial friction, the constrained-optimal contract, and the debt overhang distortion;
The system describing the equilibrium and its log-linear approximation is contained in
Appendix C; Section 3 studies the ampli¯cation and propagation mechanisms, documents
the model's quantitative predictions, and evaluates the model empirically; and Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
There are three sectors: an in¯nitely living representative household, a ¯nancial sector
made of overlapping banks that live for two periods, and a production sector made of over-
lapping ¯rms that live for two periods. Banks and ¯rms are owned by the representative
household.
Households are modeled in a standard way. They work, save and consume; they also
make deposits to banks, provide equity funds to banks and ¯rms, and receive equity
payo®s, dividends, from them.
Firms make the hiring and investment decisions, and produce using labor and physical
capital. Both factors of production are homogenous and can be freely reallocated across
¯rms, and the relative price of investment to output is constant and normalized to 1.
Labor contracts are signed and wages are paid one period in advance. As will be clear,
this timing allows to capture the debt overhang distortion on labor demand described
by Myers (1977) with a minimal departure from the standard business cycle model. It
is consistent with articles in the macro literature with labor search, e.g. the seminal
contribution of Merz (1995), where labor matches in the current period add to the stock
of employment in the next period.
The debt overhang distortion arises from the interaction between banks and ¯rms. At
the beginning of each period, a continuum of mass 1 of banks and ¯rms are born. Banks
immediately receive deposits and equity funds from households. Firms, however, before
being able to operate, need to receive starting funds from banks. Each ¯rm, then, meets
a bank, and the two sign a ¯nancial contract: In exchange for starting funds, m, the ¯rm
promises to repay the bank a payo®, P.
The ¯nancial contract is constrained-optimal, subject to a ¯nancial friction: Both
banks and ¯rms are limited liability, and the ¯rm's investment in capital and labor is
non-contractible. We show that the constrained-optimal ¯nancial contract is of the risky-
debt type: The ¯rm will fully repay a face value b only if the value of its output y will
turn out to be higher than the debt face value itself, otherwise, the ¯rm will default and
the bank will only be able to recover y.
After the debt contract is signed, the ¯rm receives equity funds from households, and
makes its hiring and investment decisions. Since the debt face value b is given at the time
of these decisions, and debt is risky, a debt overhang distortion arises: the ¯rm does not
6Some recent studies have documented the importance of ¯nancial shocks in accounting for business
cycle °uctuations. Notable examples are Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007), Gilchrist, Ortiz and
Zakrajsek (2009), and Jermann and Quadrini (2009). While we also study the impact of credit risk
shocks on macroeconomic variables, the focus of our paper is on the propagation mechanism of standard
macroeconomic shocks.
3internalize the full bene¯t of its hiring and investment choices and under-invest both in
capital and labor.
The next period, the ¯rm produces, and repays P to the bank. After that, both the
bank and the ¯rm distribute everything that they have as dividends to the households
and disappear.
2.1 Households
The utility function is [u(c)¡v(l)], with u0(c) ´ c¡°, ° > 0, and v0(l) = Ál', Á > 0;' > 0.
Households choose consumption demand ct, labor supply lt+1, and risk-free deposits dt+1
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and subject to a no-Ponzi-game constraint; given the initial values of the state, the
contingent sequences of wage rates fwt+1g1
t=0, risk-free rates frtg1
t=0, lump-sum taxes
fTtg1









t=0 from exiting banks and ¯rms, Notice that both labor is determined and wages
are paid one period in advance.
Households' necessary conditions are
u





The ¯rst equation governs the optimal consumption path depending on the risk-free rate
r, while the second equation determines the consumption-labor choice depending on the
wage rate w.
2.2 Banks
The banking sector is made of overlapping banks that live for two periods. At time t,
a new bank collects deposits dt+1=(1 + rt) and equity funds zb
t from households, meets
a ¯rm and signs a ¯nancial contract exchanging current starting funds, m, for a future
payo®, Pt+1. The time t budget constraint is m · dt+1=(1 + rt) + zb
t.
The next period, the bank receives Pt+1 from the ¯rm, repays deposits dt+1, distributes
dividends ¼b
t+1, and exits the scene. The time t+1 budget constraint is ¼b
t+1+dt+1 · Pt+1.
Since banks are owned by households, they discount future dividends using the house-




Banks, then, maximize the objective function Etf¤t;t+1¼b
t+1g ¡ zb









t = m ¡ dt+1=(1 + rt)
¼
b
t+1 = Pt+1 ¡ dt+1
4The necessary condition for dt+1 is:
1=(1 + rt) = Etf¤t;t+1g
After substituting the two budget constraints with equality and using the necessary
condition, the bank's objective function becomes:
V
b(Pt+1) ´ Etf¤t;t+1[Pt+1 ¡ dt+1]g ¡ [m ¡ dt+1=(1 + rt)]
= Etf¤t;t+1Pt+1g ¡ m
The condition that banks' expected discounted pro¯ts from lending activities are non-
negative is Etf¤t;t+1Pt+1g ¡ m ¸ 0.
2.3 Firms
The production sector is made of overlapping ¯rms that live for two periods. Firms use
capital kt+1 and labor lt+1 to produce a homogenous output yt+1,
yt+1 ´ !t+1µt+1At+1f(kt+1;lt+1)
where f(k;l) ´ (k®l1¡®)¿ is a decreasing returns to scale production function, ® 2 (0;1),
¿ 2 (0;1); µt+1 is an aggregate technology shock; !t+1 is an idiosyncratic productivity
shock, i.i.d. across all ¯rms. The aggregate term At+1 ´ A(K®
t+1L
1¡®
t+1 )1¡¿, A > 0, is an
externality that depends on aggregate capital K and aggregate labor L (where k = K
and l = L in equilibrium). Adding this term guarantees that the production function is
constant returns to scale at the aggregate level.
The idiosyncratic productivity shock ! follows the law of motion:
ln(!t+1) = ¾!;t"!;t+1
ln(¾!;t+1=¾!) = ½!;¾ ln(¾!;t=¾!) + ¾!;¾´!;t+1
where "!;t+1, all i, and ´!;t+1 are i.i.d. standard normal shocks. Aggregate productivity
µ follows the law of motion:
ln(µt+1) = ½µ ln(µt) + ¾µ;t"µ;t+1
ln(¾µ;t+1=¾µ) = ½µ;¾ ln(¾µ;t=¾µ) + ¾µ;¾´µ;t+1
where "µ;t+1 and ´µ;t+1 are two i.i.d. standard normal shocks. A ¯rm's total productivity
is the product of its idiosyncratic productivity ! and the aggregate productivity µ. No-
tice that both the volatility of aggregate productivity and the volatility of idiosyncratic









At time t, a new ¯rm needs bank ¯nancing to begin operations. The ¯rm meets a
bank and signs a ¯nancial contract exchanging current starting funds m for a future payo®
Pt+1. Once the contract is signed, the ¯rm receives equity funds z
f
t from households, buys
capital goods kt+1, hires labor lt+1, and pay wages wt+1lt+1. The time t budget constraint
is kt+1 + wt+1lt+1 · m + z
f
t . Again, notice that labor is determined and wages are paid
one-period in advance.
5The next period, the ¯rm produces yt+1, repays Pt+1 to the bank, sells the un-
depreciated capital (1 ¡ ±)kt+1 distributes dividends ¼
f
t+1, and exits the scene. The
time t + 1 budget constraint is ¼
f
t+1 + Pt+1 · yt+1 + (1 ¡ ±)kt+1, where ± 2 (0;1) is the
depreciation rate.
Since ¯rms are owned by households, they discount future dividends using the house-
holds' stochastic discount factor ¤t;t+1, the same discout factor that banks use. The ¯rm's












t = wt+1lt+1 + kt+1 ¡ m
¼
f
t+1 = yt+1 + (1 ¡ ±)kt+1 ¡ Pt+1
After substituting the two budget constraints with equality, the ¯rm's objective function
becomes
V
f(Pt+1;kt+1;lt+1) ´ Etf¤t;t+1[yt+1 + (1 ¡ ±)kt+1 ¡ Pt+1]g ¡ [wt+1lt+1 + kt+1 ¡ m]
where yt+1 ´ !t+1µt+1At+1f(kt+1;lt+1).
2.4 The Optimal Contract
The contract signed by the bank and the ¯rm is constrained-optimal subject to a ¯nancial
friction: Both banks and ¯rms are limited liability, and the ¯rm's investment in capital
and labor is non-contractible.
Non-contractibility of investment.
We assume that the contract cannot specify or depend on the ¯rm's future investment in
either capital or labor. Although a minimum investment level is required, the ¯rm cannot
commit to an exact investment level when signing the contract, and, afterwards, it is free
to choose investment to maximize its own objective function The payo® of the contract,
P, can depend on the ¯rm's output y, i.e. P = P(y), but cannot depend directly on
capital k or labor l.
This part of the friction is crucial for generating the debt overhang distortion. Since
the non-contractible investment choice of the ¯rm (the agent's the hidden action) a®ects
output y, the payo® P(y) and the objective function of the bank (the principal), a moral
hazard problem arises and under-investment follows. If the contract could directly set the
investment level, the contract would prescribe the socially optimal one, and there would
be no moral hazard problem or debt overhang distortion.
This highlights how the debt overhang distortion derives from an agency problem that
is di®erent in nature from the one considered in the ¯nancial accelerator literature. There,
the agency costs are generated by asymmetric information on output|while investment
is contractible. In our setup, instead, the output level is perfectly observable, but is only
an imperfect signal of the hidden action, i.e. the level of investment in capital and labor.
This generates a moral hazard problem, agency costs and a debt overhang distortion.
Assuming that investment and hiring decisions are not part of the contract is certainly
realistic. Although covenants sometimes require a mininum investment level, banks gen-
erally leave the most important hiring and investment decisions to ¯rms. As Freixas and
Rochet (2008, page 143) point out:
6It is characteristic of the banking industry for banks to behave as a sleeping
partner in their usual relationship with borrowers.7 For this reason, it seems
natural to assume that banks ignore the actions borrowers are taking in their
investment decisions.. This is typically a moral hazard setup. The borrower
has to take an action that will a®ect the return to the lender, yet the lender
has no control over this action.
There may be several reasons why banks generally leave the most important invest-
ment and hiring decisions to ¯rms. Firms have an obvious informational advantage on
the optimal level of hiring and investment. That optimal level is in general contingent
on events occurring and information accumulating only after the debt contract is signed.
The true investment level may be substantially di®erent from the reported one: part of
true investment, like e®ort and capacity utilization, is simply hard to report; and part of
reported investment is not true investment but rather perquisite consumption by equity
holders.
Limited liability.
Also, we assume that both banks and ¯rms are limited liability, i.e. 0 · P(y) · y all y.
The payo® cannot be negative and the ¯rm's obligation is limited to the value of its
output y.
This part of the friction also plays a role in generating the debt overhang distortion,
because it rules out risk-free debt, i.e. P = b with b constant, from the menu of possible
contracts. Without limited liability, the optimal contract would be risk-free debt, which
would make the ¯rm the residual claimant and give it full incentive to invest optimally.
Monotonicity of the payo® function.
In addition, we restrict the payo® function to be nondecreasing in output, i.e. P(y1) ·
P(y2) all y1 · y2.
This reasonable restriction can be justi¯ed, along lines suggested by Innes (1990),
assuming that the ¯rm can costlessly revise its report on output upward. For instance, one
easy way the ¯rm can raise its report on output in the second period is by purchasing some
goods, immediately re-selling them in the market, and reporting only the sale transaction.
In this case, the above restriction is without loss of generality: If the payo® function were
decreasing in output, the ¯rm could diminish its liability by simply reporting a higher
level of output; it would then be easy to construct an equivalent equilibrium with a
non-decreasing payo® function and a truth-telling report on output.
The contracting problem
All constrained-optimal contracts maximize the ¯rm's objective function subject to the
limited liability and monotonicity assumptions, the ¯rm's incentive-compatibility con-
straint, and the bank's participation constraint.
Let's momentarily drop the t and t + 1 subscripts. Let
V
f(P(y);k;l) ´ Ef¤[y + (1 ¡ ±)k ¡ P(y)]g ¡ [wl + k ¡ m]
7Regulation may even give incentives so that banks do not interfere with the choice of investment
projects by the ¯rms.
7be the objective function of the ¯rm, where y ´ !µAf(k;l), and let
V
b(P(y)) ´ Ef¤P(y)g ¡ m
be the objective function of the bank.
Let V
b
¸ 0 denote the minimum level of expected pro¯ts granted to the bank. The
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, where (k¤;l¤) is the equilibrium investment and hiring choice made by the
¯rm, and y¤ ´ !µAf(k¤;l¤) is the corresponding output level. We assume that the
contract requires a minimum investment level: The ¯rm can freely choose investment in
capital and labor in the set ­ ´ f(k;l) : f(k;l) ¸ eg, where e > 0 is a strictly positive
constant. The third constraint simply states that (k¤;l¤) is the level of investment and
hiring that maximizes the ¯rm's objective function, while the fourth constraint is the
bank's participation constraint. As V
b
varies, the set of all constrained-optimal contracts,
parameterized by V
b
, can be traced and characterized.
The optimal contract is risky debt
Appendix A shows that this problem is the same as the one studied by Innes (1990).
Intuitively, the ¯rm is choosing an e®ort level e ´ f(k;l), sustaining the cost
Ã(e) ´min
k;l
fwl + [1 ¡ Ef¤g(1 ¡ ±)]kg subject to f(k;l) ¸ e
where Ã(e) is increasing and convex. Since y = !µAe, output given e®ort is distributed
as a log-normal and its density function satis¯es the monotone likelihood ratio property,
i.e., a higher realization of output indicates a greater likelihood of higher e®ort.
Innes (1990) shows that the constrained-optimal contract is risky debt,8 i.e.,
P(y) ´ minfy;bg
for some face value of debt, b, that we will specify below at the end of this section.
Innes' result is intuitive. The constrained-optimal contract aims at encouraging the
¯rm's investment. Since high output is more likely when investment is high, the contract
assigns all the output to the bank whenever it is below a threshold b, whereas it assigns
as much as possible to the ¯rm (subject to the constraint that the payo® must be non-
decreasing in output) whenever it is above the threshold b.9
8See Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Section 4.6.2) and Freixas and Rochet (2008, Section 4.4) for
two nice expositions of Innes' result.
9As Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, page 163) put it, \when the downside of an investment is limited
both for the entrepreneur and the investor, the closest one can get to a situation where the entrepreneur
is a \residual claimant" is a (risky) debt contract."
8The face value, b, is determined by the bank's participation constraint
Ef¤minfy
¤;bgg ¡ m = V
b
:
The face value b increases with both the starting funds m and the bank's minimum
expected discounted pro¯ts V
b
.
To select one speci¯c contract among all possible constrained-optimal contracts, we
need to select a value for V
b
, i.e. the minimum value for the bank's expected discounted
pro¯ts. We focus on V
b
= 0, which corresponds to assuming that there is free-entry in
the banking sector, so the bank's outside option is zero, and the ¯rm makes a take-it-or-
leave-it o®er to the bank. In this case, the expected discounted value of the risky-debt
payo® is equal to the loan amount m.
In a later section, however, we will show the impulse response functions to a shock to
V
b
. This can be interpreted as an exogenous increase in the premium that banks charge
for their loans and can proxy for shocks to several factors a®ecting ¯rms' funding costs
such as rents due to banking market structure and power, or shocks to risk and liquidity
premiums.
2.5 The debt overhang distortion
We are now in a position to study how debt overhang distorts the ¯rm's investment
choices. Using the result that risky debt is the constrained-optimal contract, P(y) ´
minfy;bg, the ¯rm's optimization problem becomes
max
f(lt+1;kt+1)2­g
Etf¤t;t+1[yt+1 + (1 ¡ ±)kt+1 ¡ minfyt+1;bt+1g]g ¡ [wt+1lt+1 + kt+1 ¡ m]
where yt+1 ´ !t+1µt+1At+1f(kt+1;lt+1)
given the stochastic discount factor ¤, the wage rate w, the starting funds m and the
debt face value b. Notice that, at the time when the ¯rm chooses capital and labor, the
debt face value, b, is given, which is what will generate the debt overhang distortion.
The ¯rms' necessary conditions are10
1 = Etf¤t;t+1[(1 ¡ ±) + @yt+1=@kt+1]g ¡
@Etf¤t;t+1 minfyt+1;bt+1gg
@kt+1
wt+1 = Etf¤t;t+1(@yt+1=@lt+1)g ¡
@Etf¤t;t+1 minfyt+1;bt+1gg
@lt+1
For both equations, the last term on the right hand side is the debt overhang correction
term. Without that term, the equations would determine the socially optimal level of
investment (both in capital and labor). The presence of this term implies that the level of
investment is less than the socially optimal one. The debt overhang correction is present
because part of the bene¯ts of the ¯rm's investment choice accrues to the bank, and the
¯rm does not internalize this positive externality on the bank's pro¯ts.
Although risky debt is the constrained-optimal contract, it still cannot encourage the
socially optimal level of investment. Innes shows that \a \¯rst best" e®ort choice is not
achieved ...With a debt contract, the entrepreneur still works \too little" (relative to a
¯rst best)." In fact, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, pages 167-168) point out that
10The parameter ¿ controlling the returns-to-scale at the ¯rm level is set low enough so that







9\[...] when external ¯nancing is constrained by limited liability, it will
generally not be possible to mitigate the debt overhang problem [...] by
looking for other forms of ¯nancing besides debt. Indeed, Innes's result in-
dicates that under quite general conditions it is not possible to get around
this problem by structuring ¯nancing di®erently. Debt is already the ¯nancial
instrument that minimized this problem when there is limited liability."
To gain intuition on these crucial necessary conditions, notice that At+1, kt+1, lt+1
and bt+1 are all known in period t+1, and that yt+1 = !t+1µt+1At+1f(kt+1;lt+1) is log-
normally distributed with standard deviation equal to ¾t. Then, well-known analytical
results holding for log-normally distributed random variables yield:11
@Etfminfyt+1;bt+1gg
@kt+1
= Etf@yt+1=@kt+1g[1 ¡ ©(d1;t)]
@Etfminfyt+1;bt+1gg
@lt+1




and d1;t ´ d2;t + ¾t
where ©(¢) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal random vari-
able.
Using these results and the fact that the expectation of a product is equal to the
product of the expectations plus a covariance term, E(xz) = E(x)E(z) + Cov(x;z), we
can express the ¯rm's necessary conditions as follows:
1 = Etf¤t;t+1g[(1 ¡ ±) + Etf@yt+1=@kt+1g©(d1;t)] + Âk;t (2)
wt+1 = Etf¤t;t+1gEtf@yt+1=@lt+1g©(d1;t) + Âl;t (3)
where Âk;t ´ @Covt=@kt+1, Âl;t ´ @Covt=@lt+1, and Covt ´ Covt(¤t;t+1;minfyt+1;bt+1g).12
To interpret these conditions notice that ©(d2;t) is the probability that the debt will be
fully repaid, so 1 ¡ ©(d2;t) is the default probability. ©(d1;t) can be similarly interpreted
as an (adjusted) repayment probability. The di®erence between ©(d1;t) and ©(d2;t) is
quantitatively negligible and does not play any role in our model. With regard to d1;t
and d2;t, they both can be interpreted as distances to default.
These two equations are similar to the corresponding ones of a standard real business
cycle model with labor-in-advance, except for the presence of the (adjusted) probability
of repayment ©(d1;t). When output, y, exceeds the face value of the debt, b, an event that
occurs with probability ©(d1), the ¯rm repays its liabilities and receives the full marginal
return from its investment, as in the standard case. However, when output falls short
of debt, the ¯rm defaults, the bank seizes its output, and the ¯rm does not receive the
marginal return from its investment. Hence, the lower the repayment probability ©(d1),
11These results are routinely used in option pricing to compute the price of options and its derivatives
(the greeks). Appendix B details the computation of the derivatives, which involves two terms canceling
each other out.
12The Â terms on the right hand sides of the two equations (the two derivatives of the covariance) can
be loosely interpreted as risk premia associated with the co-movement between the risky debt payo® and
the stochastic discount factor. In fact, the terms are identically zero both in the absence of aggregate
uncertainty and when the default probability is zero. Their contribution to the cycle is of second-order
importance when the economy is hit by relatively small shocks, so it will not appear in our analysis based
on a ¯rst-order approximation method.
10the lower the ¯rm's expected marginal return on investment, the lower its incentive to
invest. The default probability 1¡©(d1) appears as a wedge in both the investment and
labor equations, discouraging investment and labor demand.
Equation (2) shows how the debt overhang distortion a®ects the investment decision:
a high leverage, Efln(b=y)g, implies a short distance to default, d1, and a low repayment
probability, ©(d1). The ¯rm responds by increasing the term Ef@y=@kg, i.e. by decreas-
ing investment. An analogous argument applies to the labor hiring decision, as shown in
equation (3).
Over the cycle, the default probability acts like a counter-cyclical tax, strengthening
the ¯rm's incentive to reduce investment in periods when output is below trend, leverage
is high, and the default probability is high.
It is worth noting that, as leverage, Efln(b=y)g, tends to zero, the default probability
tends to zero as well, and the debt overhang distortion disappear.13 This suggests that
the debt overhang e®ect may play a quantitatively more important role over the cycle in
periods when the business sector has already accumulated substantial debt.
2.6 Equilibrium
Let government spending g follow the law of motion:
ln(gt+1) = ½g ln(gt) + ¾g"g;t+1
where "g;t+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal shock. Government spending is ¯nanced with
lump-sum taxes: gt = Tt.
The goods market equilibrium condition is
ct + kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)kt + gt = Etf!tgµtAtf(kt;lt)
where At = A(k®
t l
1¡®
t )1¡¿ in equilibrium.
The system describing the equilibrium and its log-linear approximation is spelled out
in Appendix C. Once the equilibrium has been determined, one can compute several
variables related with credit risk. The interest rate on risky debt, the risky rate, i, is
de¯ned in terms of the ratio of the face value of debt and the amount of funds borrowed
by ¯rms,
1 + it ´
bt+1
m
so the debt face value bt+1 can be expressed as the sum of the principal, m, and interests,
itm; and the credit spread is simply de¯ned as the di®erence between the risky rate it
and the risk-free rate rt. Appendix D de¯nes the expected default frequency, the default
rate, the loss rate, the loss given default, and the recovery rate.
3 Results
In this section, we document the model's quantitative predictions and compare them with
data.
13Under our assumptions of log-normality, the default probability becomes zero only when debt tends
to zero; however, for other probability distributions, the default probability may become zero for strictly
positive values of debt.
113.1 Data and calibration
Data are quarterly for the period 1981:I|2008:IV. We use output and hours (both Non-
farm Business Sector) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, consumption (Nondurable
Goods and Services), capital and investment (both Private Fixed Nonresidential) from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, default rates (All Rated) and recovery rates (All Bonds)
from Moody's, and credit spreads (di®erence of Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield and
10-Year Treasury Note Yield at Constant Maturity) from Moody's and the Treasury De-
partment. The quarterly capital series has been obtained by interpolating the annual
data.
Table 1 lists our benchmark parametrization. The values of all preferences and produc-
tion parameters are standard. (The parameters A and Á do not matter for the dynamics
of the model.) The parameter ¿ controlling the returns-to-scale at the ¯rm level is set low
enough so that f(k;l) is su±ciently concave and the second-order conditions for optimal-
ity in the ¯rm's problem are satis¯ed. The returns to scale are constant at the aggregate
level though.
The parameters of the technology process µt are estimated from the HP-¯ltered Solow
residual. First, the autocorrelation and the volatility of the technology process are esti-
mated. Then, the ¯rst-order autocorrelation of the log-volatility process is set equal to
1, following Justiniano and Primiceri (2008). Finally, the volatility of the log-volatility
process is estimated via quasi-maximum-likelihood following Harvey, Ruiz and Shep-
hard (1994).
The government spending parameters are standard and in line with estimates based
on post-war US data. The steady state ratio of government spending to output is set to
0.18, the persistence of the government spending process, ½g, to 0.95, and the standard
deviation of the shock, ¾g, to 0.015.
Besides standard production parameters, two other parameters help determine the
default rate: the level of funds, m, and the average volatility, ¾! of the idiosyncratic
productivity. Not only they help determine what is the steady state default probability
1 ¡ ©(d2) ´ 1 ¡ ©(ln(y=b)=¾), but also how the default probability responds to shocks
and to changes in the endogenous variables. We set those two parameters to match two
conditions. First, the steady state probability of default is equal to 0.5%, which is the
mean of the quarterly default rate for All Corporates from Moody's. Also, ©0(d2)=¾ = 0:5
so the steady state probability of default increases by 0.5% as the steady state leverage
ratio, b=y, increases by one percentage point.
The dynamics of the model is sensitive to this latter choice. The greater the fraction
©0(d2)=¾, the larger the response of the default probability and of the debt overhang
distortion to shocks and to changes in the endogenous variables. As one decreases that
fraction (by decreasing the steady state probability of default, or by increasing the volatil-
ity ¾ for given steady state probability of default) the debt overhang distortion responds
less and the size of the e®ects we are emphasizing in this paper diminish.
As a result of our calibration, in the steady state, the ratio of funds to output m=y
and the ratio of debt to output b=y are equal to 0:923 and 0:928 respectively. Also, the
volatility of idiosyncratic productivity, 0:0283, is about ¯ve times the volatility of the
aggregate productivity, 0:006.
The ¯nal two parameters, ½¾;! and ¾¾;! , govern the process for the log-volatility of
the idiosyncratic productivity. The role played by these two parameters is negligible.
They do not play any role in the solution of the model and do not a®ect any impulse
12response function, other than the impulse response function to the log-volatility itself.
Hence, they can only a®ect the second moments of the model. Since there is no empirical
evidence to reasonably calibrate or estimate these two parameters, we set the volatility
of the log-volatility process equal to zero, so ¾!;t is actually constant and equal to ¾!.
We also note that, if instead one sets these two parameters equal to the corresponding
one for the aggregate productivity, ½¾;! = ½¾;µ and ¾¾;! = ¾¾;µ, the e®ect on the second
moments is quantitatively negligible. The reason why we maintain the possibility of a
variable log-volatility in the description of the model is that we ¯nd instructive showing
the impulse response function to the log-volatility itself, and we set the autocorrelation
½¾;! equal to 0:9 for this illustrative purpose.
3.2 The e®ect of credit risk shocks: VAR evidence
Before considering the model's impulse response function, we show some suggestive evi-
dence about the response of investment to credit risk shocks. Figure 1 shows the impulse
response function of a 4-lags Vector Auto-Regression of technology, the default rate,
and investment. Consistently with our model, the shocks are identi¯ed with a Cholesky
decomposition with the variables ordered as listed above, so that technology does not
respond to a contemporaneous default rate shock, whereas investment does. The ¯rst
column refers to the response to a technology shock, and agrees with intuition, with tech-
nology and investment responding positively, and the default rate negatively (although
its response is signi¯cant only marginally). Focusing on the second column, we note that
a default rate shock has an important delayed negative e®ect on investment: A shock
increasing the default rate by 25 basis points decreases investment by more than 2 per-
cent after 2 years. In addition, a F-test on the joint signi¯cance of the coe±cients of
the default rate in the investment equation strongly rejects the null of no signi¯cance,
so lags of the default rate help linearly predict future investment, even after including in
the regression lags of technology and investment themselves.
Figure 2 shows the impulse response function for a similar experiment with the credit
spread in place of the default rate. The observations for the previous case apply to this
case as well. The e®ect of a credit spread shock on investment is negative and signi¯cant
for ten quarters. A shock increasing the credit spread by 8 basis points decreases invest-
ment by more than 4 percent after 10 quarters. The coe±cients of the credit spread in
the investment equation are also jointly statistically signi¯cant.
Overall the previous evidence is suggestive of an in°uence of credit risk variables on
investment and real activity. In particular, the impulse response functions show that the
negative response of investment to credit risk shocks is signi¯cant, both statistically and
from an economic point of view. These results are consistent with those in Gilchrist,
Yankov and Zakrajsek (2009), who document that unexpected increases in bond spreads
cause large and persistent contractions in economic activity. We now turn to the model's
impulse response function to technology, government spending, funding cost and volatility
shocks.
3.3 Impulse responses
The crucial e®ect of the debt overhang distortion is on the equilibrium conditions deter-
mining investment and labor. From equations (2) and (3), disregarding the covariance
terms and evaluating the equations at equilibrium, the following two conditions can be
13derived:
1 = Etf¤t;t+1g[1 ¡ ± + Etf!t+1µt+1gAt+1fk(kt+1;lt+1)©(d1;t)]
wt+1 = Etf¤t;t+1gEtf!t+1µt+1gAt+1fl(kt+1;lt+1)©(d1;t)










½µ ln(µt) + ln(At+1f(kt+1;lt+1)) ¡ ln(bt+1)
¾t
+ ¾t
and fk and fl denote the derivatives of f with respect to its two arguments.
These two equations are similar to the corresponding ones of a standard real business
cycle model with labor-in-advance, except for the presence of the probability of repayment
©(d1;t). As already noted, the default probability 1¡©(d1;t) acts like a wedge discouraging
investment and labor demand.14
As a result, in the model with debt overhang, shocks a®ect the real economy through
an additional channel, by a®ecting the distance to default d1;t and the default probability
1 ¡ ©(d1;t). In addition to their standard e®ect, technology shocks a®ect the economy
by a®ecting the distance to default and the default probability. Shocks that do not have
an e®ect in the standard model, such as shocks to the volatility of productivity, have an
e®ect here by a®ecting the default probability.
In addition, the e®ect of shocks gets ampli¯ed and propagated through two positive
feedback loop mechanisms. The static mechanism works within one period through the
feedback between the ¯rms' investment and hiring decisions and the default probability:
any shock that discourages capital and labor decreases the distance to default d1 and
increases the default probability 1 ¡ ©(d1), which further discourages capital and labor.
The dynamic mechanism works over time through the feedback between the ¯rms' capital
stock and the default probability: any shock that discourages investment and decreases
the capital stock increases persistently the default probability, which further discourages
future investment and capital.
Technology shocks
Figure 3 shows the impulse response to an expansionary technology shock. The thick solid
line refers to our debt overhang model, while the thin one refers to the corresponding
model without any ¯nancial friction. We will comment on the dashed line, referring to a
model with monitoring costs, below in Section 3.4.
The standard e®ect of an expansionary productivity shock consists in raising the ex-
pected marginal product of capital, thereby encouraging investment. The debt overhang
distortion adds an additional e®ect: The expansionary productivity shock raises the dis-
tance to default d1, thereby lowering the default probability and further encouraging
investment. Notice the static feedback loop mechanism: an increase in capital and labor
lowers the default probability which, in turn, leads to a further increase in the demand for
capital and labor. Moreover, the debt overhang correction adds persistence to the propa-
gation mechanism because the higher capital stock tends to lower the default probability
for several periods, even as productivity returns to normal.
14The presence of investment and labor wedges has been emphasized in the business cycle accounting
work of Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2007).
14In line with the VAR evidence, the probability of default decreases substantially,
implying a smaller investment wedge, a higher expected marginal return of the ¯rms'
investment, and a higher investment and future production. Labor responds similarly to
investment. The qualitative response of all variables agrees with intuition: Credit spreads
decrease, recovery rates increase, and default rates decrease.15
Because the lending rate increases, the face value of debt increases after an expansion-
ary productivity shock. This tends to increase the probability of default and to weaken
the e®ect of an expansionary productivity shock, so debt contributes negatively to the
dynamic feedback loop mechanism. In numerical experiments, we ¯nd that the dynamics
of debt does not fully o®set the dynamics of capital, so that the e®ects of productiv-
ity shocks are always stronger and more persistent in the economy with debt overhang
relatively to the model without it.
Government spending shocks
Figure 4 shows the impulse response to an expansionary government spending shock under
the baseline calibration, ½g = 0:95. In the initial periods, the presence of debt overhang
magni¯es the output response to government spending shocks. The labor response is
positive and ampli¯ed, and this more than o®sets the decrease of investment in physical
capital due to crowding-out.
The persistence of the government spending process is, however, crucial in shaping
the response of the economy over time. The greater the persistence, the smaller the
crowding-out of investment, the greater the ampli¯cation.
Under the baseline calibration, ½g = 0:95, government spending is su±ciently per-
sistent, the crowding-out e®ect on investment is small, and the response of output is
ampli¯ed by debt overhang for several years. As the persistence increases (e.g., ½g = 1;
¯gures not shown), the response of investment may even turn positive, and the ampli¯-
cation generated by the ¯nancial friction becomes even larger. The reason for this is that
the shock permanently decreases households' income and wealth. This induces house-
holds to respond by decreasing consumption and leisure and increasing the labor supply.
The marginal product of capital increases, investment is crowded-in, and the capital stock
converges to a higher value. This generates a permanent reduction in the default rate
and, thus, a permanent reduction in the debt overhang distortion.
When government spending is less persistent (e.g., ½g < 0:90; ¯gures not shown),
the negative wealth e®ect does not su±ciently raise the labor supply, and the crowding-
out e®ect on investment in physical capital eventually dominates. Even though initially
output responds more than in the model without friction, after a su±cient number of
periods, the e®ect of low investment weighs on the capital stock, reduces output and
increases the default rate and the debt overhang distortion.
Volatility and funding cost shocks
Figures 5 and 6 respectively show the impulse response functions to a shock to the
volatility of technology µ and the idiosyncratic productivity !. Both types of shocks do
15Notice that the recovery rate refers to the subset of ¯rms that default. Hence, the e®ect on the
recovery rate is the result of the e®ect on the recovery value per given ¯rm and the e®ect on the selection
of ¯rms that default. The positive e®ect on the recovery value is then attenuated by the decrease in the
default rate, which leaves ¯rms with relatively lower idiosyncratic productivity in the pool of ¯rms that
default.
15not have any e®ect in the log-linearized version of the model without ¯nancial frictions.
In contrast, they have sizeable e®ects in the economy with debt overhang. Both shocks
have very similar e®ects, the main di®erence being that the quantitative e®ect of the
second shock is larger because the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity
process is calibrated to be larger than the one of the technology process. An unanticipated
increase in volatility decreases the distances to default. As a result, default probabilities
increase, and the expected marginal return from the ¯rms' investment decrease. As the
debt overhang distortion gets larger, investment and future production decrease. Notice
that a shock that increases the volatility of the idiosyncratic productivity, by thickening
the tail of ¯rms that default, has an especially strong e®ect on the recovery rate and on
the default rate.
It is also instructive to consider the response to a shock (with 0.9 autocorrelation) to
the bank's expected discounted pro¯ts V
b
, shown in Figure 7. This can be interpreted as
an exogenous increase in the premium that banks charge for their loans, and can proxy for
shocks to several factors a®ecting ¯rms' funding costs, such as rents due to banking market
structure and power, or shocks to risk and liquidity premiums. Of course, the shock
increases the risky rate and the credit spread. More importantly, the shock increases the
¯rms' liability and probability of default, exacerbates the ¯nancial friction, and decreases
the ¯rms' expected marginal return from investment, which, in turn, decreases actual
investment and future production. Credit spreads, loss rates and default rates increase,
whereas recovery rates decrease.
Finally, notice that, in the debt overhang model, volatility shocks and funding cost
shocks a®ect the aggregate economy only through the probability of default. Hence,
within the context of the model, they can be interpreted as credit risk shocks, and the
model impulse response function to volatility shocks and funding cost shocks can be
meaningfully compared with the VAR impulse response function to default rate shocks
and credit spread shocks, documented in the previous subsection. The model correctly
predicts the qualitative response to credit risk shocks. Quantitatively, the size of the
response of the default rate relative to the response of investment is in line with data.
In the case of volatility shocks, the size of the response of the credit spread relative to
the response of investment is smaller than in the data. In the case of a shock to funding
costs, however, it is larger than in the data.
3.4 Comparison with the monitoring cost friction
Before contrasting our debt overhang model with a monitoring cost friction setup, we
notice that the two underlying frictions are not alternative to each other. In agency costs
models µ a la Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), the output level is not observable, and
the friction arises from an asymmetric information problem between the lender and the
¯rm. This friction discourages investment by increasing the marginal cost of investing:
the external ¯nance premium. In our model, the ¯rm's non-contractible investment
action a®ects the payo® of the lender, and the debt overhang is generated by a friction
arising from a moral hazard problem. This friction discourages investment by decreasing
the ¯rm's private marginal bene¯t of investing. The debt overhang distortion is not
present in monitoring costs models because investment is contractible|one can think
that investment is chosen at the time the contract is signed. However, the two frictions,
i.e. asymmetric information on output and moral hazard due to non-contractibility of
investment, are likely to coexist and can be modeled together.
16To compare the predictions of two frameworks, we add to the standard model with
labor-in-advance and without debt overhang the monitoring costs ¯nancial friction de-
scribed in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003).16
The parameters speci¯c to the monitoring costs friction are calibrated in the plausible
way suggested by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The calibration is as follows:
the monitoring costs parameter is ¹ = 0:12; the average and autocorrelation of the en-
trepreneurs' survival probability are respectively z¤ = 0:9845 and ½z = 0:9; the standard
deviation of the idiosyncratic shock is ¾¤ = 0:28. The other parameters are calibrated as
in our model, as described in Table 1.
The dashed line in Figures 3, 6 and 7 refers to the impulse responses of the monitoring
costs model. We do not plot the response to shocks to the volatility of technology, because
they only have e®ects in our debt overhang economy. The ¯rst observation is that the
qualitative response of most variables to shocks is similar in the two models, highlighting
some common elements between the two frictions. Notice in particular the similarity of
the response to a funding cost shock in the model with debt overhang with the response
to a net worth shock in the model with monitoring costs, plotted in Figure 7. The
qualitative response to a shock to the volatility of the idiosyncratic productivity is also
similar in the two models (except for the recovery rate).
The monitoring costs model, however, does not have clear-cut predictions as to the
sign of the response of credit spreads and default rates to technology shocks, as ¯rst
pointed out by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).17 In their model, entrepreneurs ¯nance their
investment through their net worth or bank loans. After an expansionary productivity
shock, since net worth is pre-determined, they need to borrow more in order to expand
investment, which leads to counter-factually higher risk premia and bankruptcy rates.
In other models with a ¯nancial friction based on agency monitoring costs, the sign of
the responses of credit spreads and default rates to productivity shocks varies depending
on the speci¯c modeling assumptions and parameter values. In contrast, the response of
credit spreads and default rates is always negative in our debt overhang framework. This
is in line with the data. Figures 8 and 9 plot the default rate and the credit spread against
the growth rates of production, labor and investment and show their correlations. The
correlations of both the default rate and the credit spread with the three macro variables
are negative in all cases.
Furthermore, the ampli¯cation mechanism of technology shock is quantitatively small
in the model with monitoring costs, unless the monitoring costs are set equal to an
un-plausibly high level. The reason behind the quantitative di®erence between the two
models is instructive. In the model with monitoring costs, the credit spread is the sum of
the default probability and the external ¯nance premium. The ¯nancial friction, however,
is related to the external ¯nance premium only, which in turn is linked with the monitoring
costs. When the monitoring costs tend to zero, although leverage and defaults are still
present, they become irrelevant for the evolution of the aggregate variables. A plausible
16Appendix E brie°y describes the friction. For a detailed description of the friction, see Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003).
17The following is the relevant excerpt from Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997): \The foremost problem is
the cyclical behavior of bankruptcy rates and the risk premia. Because of our linearity assumptions,
these variables are functions solely of the aggregate price of capital. Hence, the increase in the price of
capital that occurs with a positive technology shock also leads to an increase in bankruptcy rates and
risk premia. From a theoretical perspective this behavior is not surprising: The supply curve for capital
is upward sloped because of agency costs, so that a demand-induced movement up this curve must imply
an increase in risk premia."
17calibration of the monitoring costs leads to a very small variability of the external ¯nance
premium, and to a very small ampli¯cation mechanism. In contrast, in the model with
debt overhang, the distortion is directly related to the default probability (there is no
external ¯nance premium), which varies sizeably both in the model and in the data.
The monitoring costs friction can lead to a larger ampli¯cation mechanism when it
acts in combination with other features, as in the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
model. In numerical experiments, we found that the most important features of their
model necessary for the friction to generate a large ampli¯cation mechanism are a variable
price of capital, a very large (close to one) autocorrelation of the technology shock, and
sticky prices together with a monetary policy rule implying a very small (about 1.1)
monetary policy long-run response of the nominal interest rate to in°ation. Given the
monetary policy rule, the degree of persistence of the technology process has dramatic
e®ects on the ampli¯cation mechanism. Indeed, when the autocorrelation of technology is
small, the monitoring costs friction can lead to an attenuation mechanism. Notice however
that, even under the parametrization of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), the
ampli¯cation and propagation mechanism is substantially smaller than the one generated
by the debt overhang distortion.
3.5 Correlations with credit spreads and default rates
Tables 2 and 3 provide some evidence in support of the debt overhang model, by compar-
ing the second moments of several variables of interest in the model and in the data. The
variables are the growth rates of labor, investment, consumption and output, and the
level of credit spread, recovery rate and default rate. The moments are correlations with
credit spread, with default rate, and with the output growth rate, and autocorrelations.
The signs of all moments match the ones in the data. Also, the correlations of the
credit variables, namely the credit spread, the recovery rate and the default rate, with
output and investment are all consistent with data. The autocorrelations of the credit
risk variables are also consistent with data. Finally, a comparison between the autocor-
relations in the models with and without debt overhang reveals how the debt overhang
distortion signi¯cantly enhances the persistence of the macro variables growth rates, help-
ing to better match their empirical counterparts.
3.6 Robustness
As already pointed out, the dynamics of the model is particularly sensitive to parameters
that a®ect the response of the default probability, 1 ¡ ©(d2;t), to shocks and to changes
in the endogenous variables.
The derivative of the default probability with respect to the distance to default,
d2;t ´ Et ln(yt+1=bt+1)=¾t, is ¡©0(d2;t), i.e., minus the density of the standard normal
random distribution evaluated at the distance to default. The greater the steady state
default probability, 1 ¡ ©(d2), the greater the steady state density ©0(d2) (for values of
the default probability less than 50%), the greater the response of the default probability
to changes in the distance to default. Hence, the debt overhang ampli¯cation and propa-
gation mechanism tends to be more powerful for larger values of the steady state default
probability, 1 ¡ ©(d2). Hence, larger values for the steady state leverage ratio, b=y raise
the steady state default probability and tend to enhance the debt overhang mechanism.
Changes in the steady state volatility, ¾, a®ect the dynamics of the default probability
18in two ways. On one hand, a larger value of the volatility, ¾, raises the default probability,
1 ¡ ©(d2), and tends to enhance the debt overhang mechanism. On the other hand,
the derivative of the default probability with respect to leverage, Et ln(bt+1=yt+1), is
©0(d2;t)=¾t; so, for given steady state density, ©0(d2), a larger value of the volatility, ¾,
lowers the response of the default probability to changes in leverage, and tends to dampen
the debt overhang mechanism.
As pointed out in the introduction, debt overhang distorts a wide range of discre-
tionary decisions. In particular, it discourages both investment in physical capital and
labor demand. To capture the labor distortion, one needs a framework where labor is
chosen after the debt contract is signed but before the uncertainty about default is re-
solved. This led us to assume that labor is chosen one period in advance, before the
realizations of the shocks become known.18
One implication of this timing assumption is that labor, i.e. total hours, responds with
one period delay to shocks. Two points deserve to be stressed. First, the implications of
this timing may be plausible. In the macro literature with search (e.g. Andolfatto (1996)),
it is commonly assumed that employment (the extensive margin) is pre-determined. Al-
though hours per worker (the intensive margin) can respond to contemporaneous shocks,
they are not very variable and explain only about 1/3 of the volatility of total hours.
This suggests that a model where labor is pre-determined may indeed generate plausible
predictions on labor response to aggregate shocks and on labor dynamics. The second
point is that whether labor is distorted by debt overhang is conceptually independent of
whether labor responds to contemporaneous shocks. As long as there remains some risk
of default, labor will be distorted by debt overhang regardless of whether it can or cannot
respond to contemporaneous shocks.
How would the debt overhang mechanism be modi¯ed if labor could respond to con-
temporaneous aggregate shocks but were still distorted by debt overhang? To investigate
the e®ect of a di®erent timing assumption on the debt overhang mechanism, we made a
simple experiment. We modi¯ed the labor demand and supply equations assuming that
the labor choice is made in the same period as that of production, after the aggregate
shocks are revealed, but before the realization of the idiosyncratic productivity shock,
so some default risk is still present and labor is still distorted by debt overhang. More
speci¯cally, we let Lt+1 be a control variable chosen after the realizations of the aggregate
shocks, and we substituted ©(d!
1;t) for ©(d1;t) in the labor demand equation (3). We found
that the ampli¯cation and propagation mechanism is practically unchanged (except, of
course, for the initial period). This suggests that the time when labor is chosen and
whether labor is predetermined or can respond to contemporaneous shocks do not play
important roles in the mechanism, as long as some default risk remains at the time of
the labor choice.
How would our results be modi¯ed if labor were not distorted by debt overhang? To
examine the contribution of the labor distortion to the ampli¯cation and propagation
mechanism, we further modi¯ed the labor demand equation, assuming that the labor
choice is not distorted by debt overhang and deleting ©(d!
1;t) altogether from the labor
demand equation (3). In this case, the debt overhang mechanism works through the
investment channel only. The qualitative e®ects of the debt overhang distortion are sim-
ilar to the ones that we have documented. Quantitatively, the debt overhang distortion
18Other frameworks could be adopted. For instance, an interesting alternative would be introducing
time to produce, as in the recent work of Schwartzman (2010), where current labor and capital a®ect
future production.
19continues to have a very persistent e®ect through its e®ect on physical capital; however,
the ampli¯cation mechanism is substantially reduced, as expected. We also considered
a model with a ¯xed labor input and we found a similar persistent e®ect and a similar
reduction in the ampli¯cation mechanism. This suggests that the persistence is primarily
determined by the distortion on investment in physical capital while the initial ampli¯-
cation mechanism works mainly through the labor distortion.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the business cycle implications of the debt overhang distor-
tion described by Myers (1977). The dynamics of this distortion, which moves counter-
cyclically, substantially amplify and propagate the response of a standard business cycle
model to technology, government spending, volatility and funding cost shocks.
The model response to shocks a®ecting the ¯rms' credit risk is in line with the VAR
response of investment to shocks to credit risk variables, such as credit spreads and
default rates. The model correlations of investment, output and credit risk variables
are consistent with data. The debt overhang distortion adds persistence to the macro
variable processes.
While there are many interesting issues that can be studied with extensions of the
model, exploring its policy implications seems very promising. Since the response of
investment to shocks is larger than socially optimal, a role for counter-cyclical policy
seems justi¯ed. A counter-cyclical subsidy to investment or a pro-cyclical tax on pro¯ts
could o®set the debt overhang distortion. And perhaps monetary policy could work in
the same direction by lowering ¯rms' funding costs during recessions.
Another natural direction would be incorporating the debt overhang distortion in a
richer model with a menu of real and nominal frictions designed to better match the data.
This would allow quantifying the relative importance of debt overhang in propagating
macroeconomic and balance sheet shocks and in explaining the labor and investment
wedges emphasized in the recent business cycle accounting literature.
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A Contracting problem
This appendix shows that the contracting problem (1) in Section 2.4, is the same as the
one studied by Innes (1990).
In analogy with the contract theory literature, it is convenient to de¯ne the ¯rm
investment \e®ort" e ´ f(k;l), and to introduce the cost function
Ã(e) ´min
k;l
fwl + [1 ¡ Ef¤g(1 ¡ ±)]kg subject to f(k;l) ¸ e
Since the production function f(k;l) is increasing and concave, the cost function Ã(e) is
increasing and convex.
Then, the objective function of the ¯rm becomes
V
f(P(y);e) ´ Ef¤[y ¡ P(y)]g ¡ Ã(e) + m





subject to 0 · P(y) · y all y












, where e¤ is the equilibrium e®ort choice by the ¯rm, and y¤ ´ !µAe¤ is
the corresponding output level. The required minimum investment level is captured by
e > 0. The third constraint simply states that e¤ is the level of e®ort that maximizes the
¯rm's objective function.
This is the same problem as the one studied by Innes (1990), except that the two objec-
tive functions V f(P(y);e) and V b(P(y)) are expressed di®erently. To obtain alternative
expressions for the two objective functions, let g(yje) be the density function of output
conditional on e®ort, so Ef¢g ´
R
f¢gg(yje)dy. Given our assumptions on µ and !, g is a
log-normal density: log(y) is normally distributed with mean equal to ½µ ln(µ¡1)+log(Ae)
and standard deviation equal to ¾. It is easy to show that g(yje) satis¯es the monotone
likelihood ratio property, so a higher realization of output indicates a greater likelihood
of higher e®ort:
22Proposition. For all e2 > e1, the likelihood ratio
g(yje2)
g(yje1) is strictly increasing in y.













where ¹(e) ´ ½µ ln(µ¡1) + log(Ae) is strictly increasing in e. Hence, for all e2 > e1,





























is strictly increasing in y.









Next, we transform the probability space introducing the probability density function
~ g(yje) ´ ¤g(yje)=~ ¯, where ~ ¯ ´
R
¤g(yje)dy is the normalizing scalar that ensures that R
~ g(yje)dy = 1, so ~ g(yje) is a probability density function. The mapping between the two
measures implies Ef¤¢g = ~ ¯ ~ Ef¢g, where ~ E is the expectation operator with respect to
the new density ~ g. With the same steps used earlier in the case of g(yje), one can show
that ~ g(yje) also satis¯es the monotone likelihood ratio property.
The objective functions of the ¯rm and the bank become:
V
f(P(y);e) ´ ~ ¯
Z
fy ¡ P(y)g~ g(yje)dy ¡ Ã(e) + m
V
b(P(y)) ´ ~ ¯
Z
fP(y)g~ g(yje)dy ¡ m
These two expressions are the same as the ones in Innes (1990). The contracting prob-
lem (1) is, then, the same as the one studied by Innes (1990), who shows that the solution
is risky debt.
B Analytical results for log-normals
This appendix applies some analytical results holding for the expectation of the minimum
of log-normal random variables, and for its derivatives, in order to derive equations (2)
and (3).
23Notice that At+1, kt+1, lt+1 and bt+1 are all known in period t+1, and that yt+1 =
!t+1µt+1At+1f(kt+1;lt+1) is log-normally distributed with standard deviation equal to ¾t.
Then, an analytical result holding for log-normally distributed random variables yields




and d1;t ´ d2;t + ¾t
where ©(¢) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal random vari-
able.




@[Efyg[1 ¡ ©(d1)] + b©(d2)]
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= Ef@y=@kg[1 ¡ ©(d1)]


































































































































= Ef@y=@lg[1 ¡ ©(d1)]
C Solution
This appendix spells out the system describing the equilibrium and its log-linear approx-
imation.
Using an analytical result holding for log-normally distributed random variables, the
bank's participation constraint becomes:
m + V
b
t = Ef¤t;t+1 minfyt+1;bt+1gg
m + V
b






and d1;t ´ d2;t + ¾t
Then, the system describing the equilibrium is:
ln(µt+1) = ½µ ln(µt) + ¾µ;t"µ;t+1;
ln(¾µ;t+1=¾µ) = ½µ;¾ ln(¾µ;t=¾µ) + ¾µ;¾´µ;t+1
ln(!t+1) = ¾!;t"!;t+1



















t = Etf¤t;t+1gfEtfyt+1g[1 ¡ ©(d1;t)] + bt+1©(d2;t)g + @Covt=@bt+1
1 = Etf¤t;t+1g[1 ¡ ± + Etf!t+1µt+1gAt+1fk(kt+1;lt+1)©(d1;t)] + @Covt=@kt+1
wt+1 = Etf¤t;t+1gEtf!t+1µt+1gAt+1fl(kt+1;lt+1)©(d1;t) + @Covt=@lt+1
ct + kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)kt + Etf!tgµtAtf(kt;lt)






½µ ln(µt) + ln(At+1f(kt+1;lt+1)) ¡ ln(bt+1)
¾t
and d1;t ´ d2;t + ¾t
This system can be solved with standard methods, log-linearizing it around its non-
stochastic steady state. Notice that the derivatives of the covariance terms disappear
from the log-linearized approximation because, in the non-stochastic steady state, the
covariances are identically equal to zero, so their derivatives are equal to zero as well.
25The following is the log-linear approximation of our equilibrium system:
^ µt+1 = ½µ^ µt + ¾µ"µ;t+1
^ ¾µ;t+1 = ½µ;¾^ ¾µ;t + ¾µ¾µ;¾´µ;t+1
^ ¾!;t+1 = ½!;¾^ ¾!;t + ¾!¾!;¾´!;t+1
¾^ ¾t = ¾!^ ¾!;t + ¾µ^ ¾µ;t
¡°^ ct + ^ wt+1 = '^ lt+1











+ b©(d2)[^ bt+1 + ©
0(d2)^ d2;t]
¾
¡°^ ct = ¡°^ ct+1 + [1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)]
½









c^ ct + k^ kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)k^ kt + y^ yt
where ^ yt ´ ^ µt + ®^ kt + (1 ¡ ®)^ lt
^ d2;t ´





^ ¾t and ^ d1;t ´ ^ d2;t + ^ ¾t
where hatted variables represent deviations (in the case of ¾, ¾µ, ¾!, d1 and d2) or
log-deviations (in the case of all other variables) from steady state, whereas non-hatted
variables represent steady state values.
D Credit risk variables
This appendix de¯nes some additional credit risk variables that we consider in our paper.
Recall that there is a continuum of mass 1 of ¯rms. Let ¯rms be indexed by i 2 [0;1].
Let !t(i) be the idiosyncratic productivity shock, i.i.d. across all the ¯rms indexed
by i 2 [0;1]. Notice that, because !t(i) is i.i.d. across a continuum of ¯rms indexed
by i 2 [0;1],
R 1
i=0 h(!t(i))di = Eth(!t) for a generic function h, where !t is a random
variable (unknown in period t) distributed as !t(i). In other words, the average of a
variable across ¯rms is equal to the expectation of the same variable for one ¯rm, prior
to the realization of !t. The following de¯nitions follow.
Expected default frequency (Probability of default):
EDFt ´ Probtf!t+1µt+1At+1f(kt+1;lt+1) · bt+1g
= Probt
½
ln(!t+1µt+1) ¡ ½µ ln(µt)
¾t
·




= 1 ¡ ©(d2;t)
where d2;t ´
½µ ln(µt) + ln(At+1f(kt+1;lt+1)) ¡ ln(bt+1)
¾t

















































2;t))bt ¡ (1 ¡ ©(d!
1;t))µtAtf(kt;lt)
bt
= (1 ¡ ©(d
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i=0 maxfbt(i) ¡ !t(i)µtAtf(kt(i);lt(i));0gdi
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27E The monitoring costs ¯nancial friction
In this appendix, we brie°y describe the monitoring costs ¯nancial friction, based on
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), that we add to a standard model with labor-in-
advance for the purpose of comparing its e®ect with the debt overhang distortion.
Households supply funds to a perfectly competitive banking sector at the risk free rate
Rt. In turn, banks lend those funds to risk-neutral entrepreneurs at the risky rate Re
t+1.
Entrepreneurs combine their own funds Nt+1 with the bank loans Bt+1, and purchase
capital Kt+1 at a price Qt:
QtKt+1 = Nt+1 + Bt+1
We neglect investment adjustment costs, so output is freely transformable into capital
and consumption, and the price of capital relative to consumption, Qt, is one.
After capital is purchased, each entrepreneur is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, !t+1,
with distribution F(!t+1;¾!;t), that changes the level of capital from Kt+1 to !t+1Kt+1.
The next period, entrepreneurs rent their capital to ¯rms at the rental rate Rk
t+1 and ¯rms
produce output from capital and labor. Finally, after production occurs, the entrepreneur
receives back the depreciated capital, (1 ¡ ±)!t+1Kt+1, and pays his debt to the banks.
The loan, however, is risky, because the entrepreneur's liability is limited to the rent that






It is useful to de¯ne a threshold ¹ !t+1 such that all entrepreneurs for whom !t+1 < ¹ !t+1






Credit market frictions arise because the realization of !t+1 is observable to the lender
only after paying a monitoring cost ¹!t+1Rk
t+1QtKt+1, with 0 · ¹ < 1. In equilibrium,
banks pay the costs to monitor all the entrepreneurs that default.
The equilibrium rates and external ¯nance premium are determined by two key con-
ditions. The ¯rst one is the zero-pro¯t condition for banks, which is assumed to hold
state-by-state:19








The ex-post revenues from banking activity|the interest payments plus the recovered
values net of monitoring costs|must equal the banks' cost of funds.
The second condition follows from the solution of an optimal loan contract between
banks and entrepreneurs. The optimal contract maximizes the entrepreneurs' expected










19A consequence of this assumption is that Re
t+1, the lending rate between t and t + 1, will be a
function of the t + 1 aggregate shocks, which rules out both banks' default and positive pro¯ts. The
state-contingent nature of the debt contract makes more di±cult the mapping of the lending rate Re to
a data counterpart.
28Table 1: Benchmark parameter and steady state values
Parameter Value Description
® 0.33 Capital share in the production function
¿ 0.614 Returns to scale at the ¯rm level
± 0.025 Depreciation rate of capital
¯ 0.995 Preference discount factor
° 1 Relative risk aversion
' 1 Inverse of labor supply elasticity
½µ 0.7 Autocorrelation of technology
¾µ 0.006 Volatility of technology
½¾;µ 1 Autocorrelation of technology log-volatility
¾¾;µ 0.0758 Volatility of technology log-volatility
¾! 0.0283 Volatility of idiosyncratic productivity
½¾;! 0.9 Autocorrelation of idiosyncratic-productivity log-volatility
¾¾;! 0 Volatility of idiosyncratic-productivity log-volatility
½g 0.95 Autocorrelation of government spending
¾g 0.015 Volatility of government spending
1 ¡ ©(d2) 0.005 Probability of default
m=y 0.923 Ratio of starting funds to output
b=y 0.928 Ratio of debt face value to output
V
b
0 Banks' expected pro¯ts
given the banks' zero-pro¯t condition.
The solution of the contracting problem gives, after some manipulations, a relation
between the external ¯nance premium, EtfRk
t+1g=Rt¡1, and the default threshold, ¹ !t+1,
that can be expressed as
Etfg(¹ !t+1)[R
k
t+1=Rt ¡ ~ g(¹ !t+1)]g = 0
where g and ~ g are functions of ¹ !t+1 (and ¾!;t). When the monitoring costs are zero,
¹ = 0, both g and ~ g are identically equal to one, i.e. g(¹ !t+1) ´ 1 and ~ g(¹ !t+1) ´ 1, for
all ¹ !t+1. This implies that the expected return on capital must equal the risk-free rate,
EtRk
t+1 = Rt, as in the linearized standard business cycle model: even though defaults
may occur, F(¹ !) > 0, the external ¯nance premium is zero and no ¯nancial accelerator
arises.
29Table 2: Correlations with credit spread, default rates and output
Corr. with Corr. with Corr. with
Credit Spread Default Rate Output
Model Data Model Data Model Data
Investment -0.3379 -0.5805 -0.2190 -0.5261 0.9683 0.3545
Consumption -0.3265 -0.3162 -0.3591 -0.1900 0.4300 0.5141
Production -0.3985 -0.4398 -0.2664 -0.2038 1.0000 1.0000
Credit Spread 1.0000 1.0000 0.9432 0.3952 -0.3985 -0.4398
Recovery Rate -0.8881 -0.2137 -0.9292 -0.6514 0.2160 0.2251
Default Rate 0.9432 0.3952 1.0000 1.0000 -0.2664 -0.2038
Table 3: First-order autocorrelations
Model without Model Data
Debt Overhang
Investment 0.0895 0.2125 0.5464
Consumption 0.0707 0.0831 0.4664
Production 0.1257 0.2682 0.4213
Credit Spread | 0.7931 0.8090
Recovery Rate | 0.8596 0.9804
Default Rate | 0.8544 0.7560
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2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of INVESTMENT to DEFAULT_RATE
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations – 2 S.E.
Figure 1: VAR impulse response function to shocks identi¯ed with Cholesky decomposi-
tion. Technology and investment are in log-levels. All variables are multiplied by 100.
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2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Response of INVESTMENT to CREDIT_SPREAD
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations – 2 S.E.
Figure 2: VAR impulse response function to shocks identi¯ed with Cholesky decomposi-
tion. Technology and investment are in log-levels. All variables are multiplied by 100.
32Response to a technology shock


















































Figure 3: Model response to an expansionary technology shock. The thick solid, thin solid
and dashed lines respectively refer to our debt overhang model, a corresponding model
without any ¯nancial friction, and a model with a monitoring costs ¯nancial friction.
33Response to a government spending shock





















































Figure 4: Model response to an expansionary government spending shock. The thick solid
and thin solid lines respectively refer to our debt overhang model, and the corresponding
model without any ¯nancial friction.
34Response to the volatility of technology



















































Figure 5: Model response to a positive shock to the volatility of technology. The thick
solid line refers to our debt overhang model.
35Response to the volatility of idiosyncratic
productivity


















































Figure 6: Model response to a positive shock to the volatility of idiosyncratic productivity.
The thick solid and dashed lines respectively refer to our debt overhang model, and a
model with a monitoring costs ¯nancial friction.
36Response to a funding cost shock


















































Figure 7: Model response to a shock increasing the funding costs. The thick solid and
dashed lines respectively refer to our debt overhang model, and a model with a monitoring
costs ¯nancial friction. For the latter model, we plot the response to a net worth shock.
37Default rate and macro variables














Production (Thick line) and Default Rates (Thin line), Correlation=−0.2309









Labor (Thick line) and Default Rates (Thin line), Correlation=−0.50786
















Investment (Thick line) and Default Rates (Thin line), Correlation=−0.51981



















Credit Spread (Thick line) and Default Rates (Thin line), Correlation=0.39768








































































Figure 8: Time series. The thick solid lines refer respectively to the growth rates of
production, labor, and investment, and to the level of the credit spread. The thin solid
line refers to the default rate. The vertical bars indicate the beginning and end of NBER
recessions.
38Credit spread and macro variables














Production (Thick line) and Credit Spread (Thin line), Correlation=−0.44868









Labor (Thick line) and Credit Spread (Thin line), Correlation=−0.58469
















Investment (Thick line) and Credit Spread (Thin line), Correlation=−0.58689



















Default Rates (Thick line) and Credit Spread (Thin line), Correlation=0.39768








































































Figure 9: Time series. The thick solid lines refer respectively to the growth rates of
production, labor, and investment, and to the level of the default rate. The thin solid
line refers to the credit spread. The vertical bars indicate the beginning and end of NBER
recessions.
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